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BUILDING BRIDGES TO REMEDIES FOR CONSUMERS IN
INTERNATIONAL eCONFLICTS
Amy J. Schmitz*
Consumer purchases over the Internet ("ePurchases") are on the rise,
thereby causing an increase in conflicts regarding these purchases
("eConflicts"). Furthermore, these conflicts are increasingly international as
consumers purchase goods over the Internet not knowing or caring where
the seller is physically located. The problem is that if the purchase goes
awry, consumers are often left without recourse due to the futility of pursing
international litigation and the textured law and policy regarding enforce-
ment of private dispute resolution procedures, namely arbitration.
The United States has been exceptional in its robust enforcement of ar-
bitration contracts in business-to-consumer ("B2C") relationships, while
other countries have refused or limited enforcement of arbitration in these
relationships. Furthermore, some businesses have used their power to im-
pose onerous arbitration regimes in their international B2C online contracts
("eContracts"). Consumers subject to these contracts have been left con-
fused whether they must abide by these regimes, and, even more uncertain,
where to turn in seeking remedies on their eContract claims. This essay ad-
dresses the lack of consumer remedy mechanisms, and seeks to spark con-
sideration of expanded use of online processes for resolving B2C eConflicts.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has created a boundaryless marketplace for companies and
consumers. This has allowed consumers to purchase goods over the Internet
from sellers who may be located in other countries. Consumers often benefit
from the expanded selection, options, and competitive pricing that this glob-
al marketplace provides. However, consumers lose out when an ePurchase
goes awry, especially when they have no access to reliable and low-cost
mechanisms for seeking remedies with respect to their purchases. Litigation
is already impractical for most consumers with respect to domestic purchas-
es, and it is especially problematic or impossible for international consumer
claims.
At the same time, companies often include arbitration clauses in their
contracts to cut dispute resolution costs and produce savings that they may
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pass on to consumers through lower prices. Furthermore, arbitration can be
especially beneficial in cross-border cases because international arbitration
awards may be more enforceable than court judgments. This has led to near
universal enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards in business-to-
business ("B2B") cases.
The United States has joined with 145 other countries to enforce arbi-
tration in international relationships under the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York
Convention").' This treaty generally mandates strict enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements and awards in accordance with parties' written agreements.2
The U.S. Congress implemented this Convention through Chapter Two of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and courts have applied this law with a
pro-enforcement glaze to promote arbitration and international comity.3
Courts in the United States similarly enforce domestic arbitration under
Chapter One of the FAA,4 and its state counterpart, the Uniform Arbitration
Act (UAA).5 These arbitration laws augment arbitration enforcement with
provisions for liberal venue, immediate appeal from orders adverse to arbi-
tration, appointment of arbitrators if parties cannot do so by agreement, lim-
ited review of arbitration awards, and treatment of awards as final judg-
ments. 6 The Supreme Court of the United States has read these laws to nar-
rowly restrict courts' review of arbitration awards and refrain from using
state law to single out arbitration for special treatment or otherwise hinder
enforcement of arbitration in contracts affecting interstate commerce.7 This
1. United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, arts. 1-16, UNCITRAL, (Jul.
6, 1988), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_le.pdf [here-
inafter NY Convention].
2. Id; ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE
PARTASIDES, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 68-69 (3d
ed. 1999).
3. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2012) (implementing the New
York Convention); id §§ 301-307 (implementing the Panama Convention); Christopher R.
Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP.
L. 233, 233 (2006) (noting how the United States' strict enforcement of arbitration has made
it a popular venue for international arbitration proceedings).
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
5. REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1 (2000). The UAA is model legislation that nearly
all states have adopted to require the same basic enforcement for local arbitration agreements
and awards beyond the purview of the FAA.
6. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through
Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 124-35 (2002), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=943528 (discussing the FAA's pro-efficiency remedial provisions).
7. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (emphasizing that an
arbitrator's decision will be set aside "only in very unusual circumstances"); IDS Life Ins.
Co. v. Royal Alliance Assocs., Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2001) (refusing to vacate an
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leaves states with little power to regulate arbitration provisions beyond ap-
plication of general contract defenses.8
This enforcement regime has not been internationally divisive in B2B
cases. However, the United States has been exceptional in its extension of
this regime to employment and B2C transactions. Despite noted benefits of
arbitration in B2B contexts, there have been widespread criticisms of arbi-
tration in B2C and employment disputes. Many nations have therefore
shunned enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in these cases
based on public policy and arbitral competence concerns. 9 For example,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom generally cite importance of
protecting public rights in refusing to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments in employment contracts with respect to employees' wrongful dismis-
sal claims."
Arbitration can be problematic in uneven bargaining contexts. Policy-
makers worry that private arbitrators will not properly and reliably apply the
law, and that companies will hide their transgressions under the cloak of
privacy in arbitration. They also criticize arbitration as allowing companies
to take advantage of asymetric power in their contracts with individuals."
This is why public policies in many countries protect employees' rights to
bring their dismissal claims to public tribunals or courts. 2 The same con-
cerns have led the United Kingdom and Europe to limit or preclude en-
forcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in B2C cases. 3
award despite a record "suggest[ing] that the arbitrators lacked the professional competence
required to resolve the parties disputes").
8. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (finding the FAA
limits challenges to arbitration agreements to general contract defenses, and therefore
preempted state notice requirements that singled out arbitration clauses for special treatment);
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 266 (1995) (holding the FAA
preempted Alabama law limiting consumer arbitration); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984) (holding that the FAA applies in federal and state court).
9. See PABLO CORTES, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CONSUMERS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 107-11 (2010) (noting how the United States and the EU have diverged in their en-
forcement of arbitration in consumer contexts and citing EU Directives and Regulations
voiding pre-dispute arbitration clauses in these cases for policy reasons); Matthew W. Finkin,
Privatization of Wrongful Dismissal Protection in Comparative Perspective, 37 INDUS. L. J.
149, 153-63 (2008) (highlighting comparative enforcement of arbitration in employment
contexts and American exceptionalism in its allowance for arbitration of dismissal claims),
available at http://ilj.oxfordjournals.org/content/37/2/149.full.pdf.
10. Finkin, supra note 9, at 149-65.
11. See, e.g., id. at 155-56, 159-60 (discussing policies for precluding private arbitra-
tion of employment claims).
12. Id. at 149-65. See also Clyde & Co. L.L.P. v. Van Winkelhof, [2011] EWHC (QB)
668, [2011] C.P. Rep. 31(refusing enforcement of an arbitration agreement in an employment
relationship).
13. See CORTES, supra note 9, at 106-12; Jean R. Stemlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb?
Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that
2012]
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Concerns about arbitral fairness have also led arbitration providers in
the United States to suggest due process protocols for consumer and em-
ployment arbitration.14 For example, the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) created a National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee ("Advi-
sory Committee") in the late 1990s, resulting in promulgation of the 1998
Consumer Due Process Protocol ("Protocol"). 5 This Protocol suggested that
companies "should" provide consumers with clear notice of arbitration
clauses, information regarding the arbitration process, preserved access to
small claims court, and measures ensuring reasonable costs and hearing lo-
cations. 6 Private arbitration providers have also promulgated special proce-
dural rules that they use for small dollar cases in B2C contexts. 7
At the same time, public policymakers in the United States have be-
come increasingly critical of FAA enforcement of arbitration in consumer
and employment cases. This can be seen in renewed efforts to enact the Ar-
bitration Fairness Act (AFA), which would ban pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in consumer, employment, and civil rights cases. "8 Furthermore,
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-
Frank"), signed into law on July 21, 2010,19 bans enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in mortgage contracts and with respect to claims under
of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 831, 843-64 (2002) (highlighting how the
United States has diverged from European and most other nations by enforcing pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in consumer and employment contracts).
14. Consumer Due Process Protocol, NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE (Apr. 17, 1998), http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014
[hereinafter Protocol]; JAMS Consumer Arbitration Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses: Mini-
mum Standards of Procedural Fairness, JAMS (July 15, 2009),
http://www.jamsadr.com/consumer-arbitration/ [hereinafter JAMS Fairness Standards];
Statement of Ethical Principles for American Arbitration Association, an ADR Provider




state%3Dfud6h23g7_42 (last visited Apr. 14, 2012) [hereinafter AAA Statement of Ethical
Principles].
15. See Protocol, supra note 14.
16. Protocol, supra note 14.
17. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L.
REv. 69, 87-91 (2007) (discussing providers' due process rules).
18. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); S. 987,
112th Cong. (1 st Sess. 2011). See also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111 th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); 111. Access to Courts, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Proposals for
Reform of Consumer-Defendant Arbitration, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1170, 1170-81 (2009) [here-
inafter Access to Courts] (discussing the AFA and critiquing its blanket approach).
19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
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the whistle-blower provisions of the Act.2" It also gives the newly created
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) the power to write and en-
force various lending and consumer protection regulations, which may in-
clude prohibition or limitations on enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
21agreements in consumer financial products and services contracts. The Act
also gives the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) power to limit or
prohibit agreements requiring customers of any broker or dealer to arbitrate
future disputes arising under federal securities laws.22
This Essay does not detail this divisive law and policy regarding the
propriety, fairness, and efficiency of consumer arbitration. That has been
covered elsewhere. 3 Instead, the Essay aims to highlight difficulties created
20. Id. § 1414. The provision amends the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and is codified in
15 U.S.C. § 1639(c) (the Act's effective date for provisions that do not call for regulations is
July 22, 2010).
21. Dodd-Frank, supra note 19, § 1028. See also Consumer Financial Protection Agency
Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 111 th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (the bill that is now the Dodd-Frank
Act establishing an agency to regulate consumer financial products and services and authoriz-
ing the agency to approve pilot programs for effective disclosure of consumer contract
terms); David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, How the Consumer Financial Protection Agen-
cy Act of 2009 Would Change the Law and Regulation of Consumer Financial Products, 2
BLOOMBERG L. REP.: RISK AND COMPLIANCE 9, 9-14 (Oct. 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1491117 (critiquing the Dodd-Frank Act for advocating broad ap-
plications without adequate evidentiary basis).
22. Dodd-Frank, supra note 19, § 921 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1934)).
23. Indeed, this debate has been surging for many years, and there is an abundance of
relevant articles, books, and commentary. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitra-
tion: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 759 (2001) (critiquing
arbitration of employment claims); Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 187, 213-14 (2006) (defending arbitration to the extent that it is less "law-
less" than some fear); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1247, 1247-1342 (2009) (highlighting the arbitration debate and critiquing
arguments advancing the fairness of pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of
Consent, 62 BROOK. L REV. 1381, 1410-14 (1996) (critiquing companies' use of arbitration
provisions); Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 637 (1996) (critiquing
companies' use of arbitration clauses in contracts with consumers and employees); Consumer
Arbitration Before the American Arbitration Assoc.: Preliminary Report, SEARLE CIVIL
JUSTICE INST., 68-87 (Mar. 2009), http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_010205
(reporting study results indicating that, overall, consumers do fairly well in arbitration versus
court on warranty claims). See also Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes
Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 627 (2008) [hereinafter War-
ranty Woes] (discussing pros, cons, and ideas for reform with respect to consumer arbitra-
tion); Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting
Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (2010) [hereinafter Legislating in the
Light] (discussing arbitration debate and research, and need for disclosure regulations in light
of empirical data); Amy J. Schmitz, Regulation Rash? Questioning the AFA 's Approach for
Protecting Arbitration Fairness, 28 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 16 (2009) [herein-
2012]
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by problematic and uncertain enforcement of B2C arbitration, and invites
use of the Internet to create fair and globally enforceable Online Dispute
Resolution (ODR) and Online Arbitration (what I call "OArb") mechanisms.
Such mechanisms could build bridges for consumers to access remedies
with respect to eConflicts. They would capitalize on the growth and effi-
ciency of the Internet while protecting consumers from onerous or costly
procedures that render remedies meaningless.
II. IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING FAIR AND ACCEPTED B2C REMEDY
MECHANISMS
It is no surprise that international B2C eConflicts are on the rise along
with international consumer ePurchases. What many fail to consider, how-
ever, are the hurdles consumers face in seeking resolution of these conflicts.
It usually is not feasible for consumers to sue recalcitrant businesses located
abroad due to the futility of pursuing international litigation and unclear
enforcement of foreign judgments. This leaves these businesses with little
incentive to voluntarily provide remedies to consumers with respect to their
ePurchases.
At the same time, many companies cognizant of their own needs for
uniform contract enforcement mechanisms have adopted arbitration pro-
grams that bypass the uncertainty and variability of public court systems.
These companies promulgate form contracts that require consumers to sub-
mit any disputes arising from their ePurchases to binding arbitration. As
highlighted above, the United States has been exceptional in its robust en-
forcement of these B2C arbitration contracts under federal and international
law. Businesses applaud this enforcement as allowing them to cut conflict
resolution costs through adoption of arbitration programs, and arguably pass
on the savings to consumers through lower prices and better quality goods.
Nonetheless, there are valid criticisms of some companies' use of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in B2C contracts. Some companies abuse their
use of arbitration clauses to avoid legal regulations and impede consumers'
access to remedies. This has led some policymakers in the United States to
clamor for major legislative and regulatory changes with respect to such
arbitrations. Moreover, such policy issues have led other countries to limit
or bar enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in these B2C cas-
es.
24
after Regulation Rash] (critiquing the AFA's approach and offering suggestions for proce-
dural fairness regulations).




Concerns regarding the fairness of B2C arbitration suggest cause for
careful consideration of remedy-system improvements. Furthermore, divi-
sive and uncertain enforcement of arbitration clauses in international B2C
contracts creates confusion and inefficient litigation for consumers and
companies. Consumers and companies suffer when companies cannot rely
on any savings from arbitration programs, and pass those savings on through
lower prices and better quality. Furthermore, everyone suffers when litiga-
tion over arbitration enforcement clogs the courts and hinders arbitration's
purported efficiency benefits.25
Nonetheless, those that denounce enforcement of pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses argue that the unfairness of these clauses outweigh any necessi-
ty or benefits. They propose that companies and consumers will agree to
arbitrate post-dispute if arbitration would be beneficial. This is the approach
of the AFA noted above. This is unwise, however, because parties are loathe
to agree to anything post-dispute when relationships sour. In addition, com-
panies cannot lower prices or otherwise pass on cost savings based on the
hopes of establishing post-dispute arbitration programs.26
Furthermore, consumers' falsely negative assumptions about arbitra-
tion often prevent them from agreeing to post-dispute arbitration agree-
ments. However, the data indicates that consumers are generally satisfied
with their arbitration experiences.27 For example, a 2009 study of AAA con-
sumer arbitrations found that consumers were generally satisfied with their
proceedings and succeeded in 53.3% out of 301 arbitrations studied. They
also recovered an average of $19,255, or 52.1%, of the damages they sought
in those arbitrations.28
25. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777-80 (2010); Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967); Walton v. Rose Mobile
Homes, LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 2002) (each discussing courts' unpredictable appli-
cation of contract defenses and other challenges of arbitration clauses).
26. Others have also argued that the AFA approach of barring enforcement of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in broad and ill-defined categories was over- and under-inclusive,
and that it may be more beneficial to legislate procedural reforms. See, e.g., Congress Con-
siders Bill to Invalidate Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses for Consumers, Employees, and
Franchisees-Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 1 l0th Cong. (2007), 121 HARV. L.
REV. 2262, 2267-68 (2008) (critiquing the Act's broad scope and approach).
27. See Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbi-
tration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1051, 1054-75 (2009) (questioning
assumptions that arbitration is bad for consumers); Arbitration: Simpler, Cheaper, and Faster
than Litigation, HARRIS INTERACTtVE, http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/
ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2005HarrisPoll.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2012) (indicating that
forty percent of those who lost in arbitration were still satisfied with the process). See also
Legislating in the Light, supra note 23 (discussing the empirical data).
28. Task Force on Consumer Arbitration, supra note 23, at 68-87 (noting that business
claimants' 83.6% success rate does not necessarily indicate pro-business bias because these
claims were clear nonpayment cases).
2012]
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There is a need for more comparison statistics for B2C litigation, but,
nonetheless, the data overall suggests that arbitration is not as "bad" for con-
sumers as many assume. 29 Furthermore, many companies conform their
arbitration programs to the Protocol noted above and follow providers' rules
safeguarding fairness in B2C proceedings.30 Moreover, the need for en-
forceable arbitration programs escalates in international eConflicts where
traditional judicial remedies are impractical or nonexistent.
That is not to say that costly and unfair arbitration programs are better
than no arbitration in international cases. Current arbitration programs are
not sufficiently regulated, transparent, or user-friendly. For example, studies
focused on pre- and post-process perceptions and satisfaction with respect to
dispute resolution highlight the need for sufficient notice and dispute resolu-
tion education.' In one study, survey findings indicated that the disputants'
initial perceptions of dispute resolution processes did not impact what pro-
cesses they ultimately used. The researchers surmised that this was likely
due to parties' lack of necessary knowledge or experience regarding dispute
resolution processes to make informed assessments.3 2
Such problems with current arbitration systems are not insurmountable,
especially with respect to resolution of eConflicts. The Internet provides
inexpensive means for educating consumers about arbitration and other
available ways for resolving claims with respect to their ePurchases. Arbi-
tration providers already have begun to capitalize on the benefits of the In-
ternet and computer-mediated communication ("CMC") to expand consum-
er education and B2C remedy mechanisms.33 Furthermore, growth of CMC
29. See Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card Industry Using it to Quash Legal
Claims?: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. 123 (2009) (testimony of Christopher Drahozal
acknowledging need for comparison statistics for B2C litigation).
30. Task Force on Consumer Arbitration, supra note 23, at 70-87.
31. Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perceptions of Dispute Resolu-
tion Procedures: A Longitudinal Empirical Study 1-5, 21-26 (U.C. Davis Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 130, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-1 103585 (discussing a longitudinal field study involving 108 com-
pleted paper surveys of disputants with cases filed in late 2004/early 2005 followed by phone
surveys with forty-four of these disputants and forty-four cases in which twenty-six were
settled or dismissed, nine went to trial, one to mediation, and one to arbitration).
32. Id. at 30-42 (concluding that courts could improve disputants' ex-post satisfaction
by subsidizing neutral fees for court mandated ADR and giving disputants the option of pur-
suing trials).
33. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; a Market Incentive
Solution to Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process,
and Fair Play in Online Consumer Arbitration, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 3 (2002) (dis-
cussing consumer use of the Internet to access information and utilize dispute resolution).
[Vol. 34
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provides fuel for expansion of transparent and user-friendly ODR and OArb
processes that are free or low-cost for consumers.34
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR USING OARB TO EXPAND CONSUMERS' ACCESS TO
REMEDIES
A. Minimum Standards
As I have suggested for in-person B2C arbitration, policymakers also
should require that B2C remedy mechanisms for resolution of global
eConflicts must comply with procedural fairness standards similar to those
set forth in the Protocol.35 These standards should include the following:
* Notice: Consumers should not be surprised to learn that they must
arbitrate or abide by another process for resolving their claims after disputes
develop. Instead, the burden should be on companies to clearly and concise-
ly state in their contracts how consumers can file claims and where they can
find further resources. This notice should include contact information for the
designated dispute resolution providers and list any fees a consumer must
pay in order to file claims.
e Consumer Voice in Selection of Neutrals: The NY Convention and
FAA require a baseline degree of arbitrator neutrality. However, regulations
should go further to ensure consumers have equal voice in selecting arbitra-
tors or other neutrals charged with making determinations with respect to
consumers' claims. Consumers should have power to choose neutrals from a
list or database of individuals who have received accreditation after comple-
tion of training and compliance with strict disclosure requirements.
* Contained Costs: Although the overall cost differential of arbitra-
tion/private dispute resolution versus litigation is unclear, some companies'
arbitration clauses may impose high front-end filing and administration
costs that hinder individuals from bringing claims. Rules should cap con-
sumers' arbitration fees. Moreover, expansion of free or low-cost ODR
34. See Amy J. Schmitz, "Drive-Thru" Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering
Consumers Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REv. 178, 240-43 (2010) (discussing how
online arbitration ("OArb"), opens new avenues for consumers to obtain remedies on their
contract complaints). See also Philippe Gilliron, From Face-to-Face to Screen-to-Screen:
Real Hope or True Fallacy?, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 301, 308-10 (2008) (noting use
for consumer small claims); Haitham A. Haloush & Bashar H. Malkawi, Internet Character-
istics and Online Alternative Dispute Resolution, 13 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 327, 327-29
(2008) (discussing how use of online ADR can foster efficient dispute resolution and maxim-
ize the growth of e-commerce in England and abroad).




mechanisms would help alleviate cost concerns for both companies and con-
sumers.
36
* Access to Information: Arbitration critics have highlighted how arbi-
tration's uncertain allowance for discovery can be problematic for consum-
ers in B2C eConflicts who need to gather information within the companies'
control. For example, limited or uncertain discovery in arbitration may hin-
der a consumer from obtaining interoffice memoranda to prove company
management's knowledge regarding a defective product. Regulations should
therefore ensure consumers' access to needed evidence, while continuing to
give arbitrators discretion to set reasonable limits on discovery in order to
contain costs and time involved in the dispute resolution process. Use of the
Internet can help further this objective with online document exchanges.
* Finality and Compliance: Regulations should strictly limit time for
conducting and concluding a contractually required process for resolving
eConflicts. For example, rules for OArb could require that claimants submit
all their arguments and complete evidentiary exchanges within thirty days of
complaint filing. The rules could then give online arbitrators no more than
five days to make determinations, and provide means for ensuring strict and
timely compliance with those determinations. This fosters efficiency and
gives meaning to remedies ordered. Indeed, awards are meaningless if con-
sumers must fight to actually enforce them.
* Preservation of Statutory Remedies: Many countries base their refus-
als to enforce arbitration of B2C disputes on concerns that arbitrators will
not protect public rights, and proponents of the AFA echo such concerns.37
Regulations therefore should bar limits on statutory remedies in binding
private dispute resolution processes unless the parties agree to limits after
disputes arise. This recognizes that B2C contracting generally lacks the ro-
bust contractual freedom that supports pre-dispute contract remedy limits in
B2B contexts. Furthermore, statutory rights deserve special protection to
further their public interests. For example, statutes such as the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) rely on consumers' prosecutions of these claims and
requests for statutory damages to help curb lenders' misconduct.
* Public Disclosure: Although privacy has been a hallmark of arbitra-
tion and other private dispute resolution mechanisms, it should not prevent
public exposure of company improprieties that impact consumers' health or
safety.38 In addition, B2C remedy mechanisms will not gain international
36. See AAA Statement of Ethical Principles, supra note 14 (discussing the AAA's fee
schedule for consumer claims).
37. CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION art. L132-1 & art. L132-1 Annex l(q) (Fr.), available
at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=61 (last visited Apr. 14, 2012) (directing
that arbitration clauses that hinder consumer remedies are void as "unfair").
38. See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1211, 1212-18 (2006) (considering benefits and drawbacks of privacy in arbitration).
[Vol. 34
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credibility and acceptance unless they are sufficiently transparent. Regula-
tions therefore should require disclosure regarding applicable processes to
the extent necessary to foster consumer protections and preclude companies
from using a mechanism's privacy to escape liability or otherwise hide legal
* 39violations.
B. Implementation Through Online Remedy Mechanisms
The above considerations should guide creation of mandatory mini-
mum standards for internationally endorsed eConflict resolution processes.
This section aims to build on these initial standards in offering further sug-
gestions for the development and implementation of these processes.
Again, the Internet gives policymakers exciting opportunities for build-
ing eConflict resolution mechanisms that capitalize on the benefits of CMC.
The aim should be to craft OArb and other ODR processes that comply with
mandatory minimum standards for transparency and fairness. Furthermore
such processes should be user-friendly and worth their costs in light of the
complexity and possible payout on the claims at issue.4" Processes should be
sufficiently simple for consumers to use without the need for legal assis-
tance and should allow consumers to obtain neutral claim evaluations and
enforceable remedies.'"
Use of CMC and ODR is not entirely new. Online remedy processes al-
ready exist. For example, the Better Business Bureau (BBB) facilitates
mechanisms for resolving consumers' complaints against automobile deal-
ers, cellular phone companies, and most other B2C merchants.42 These
mechanisms help consumers gain companies' attention to their claims and
often lead to dispute settlements. These processes are non-binding unless the
parties agree that the result will be final, but companies' reputational con-
cerns often prompt them to provide remedies on claims that the BBB deter-
mines valid and supported by adequate information to be worthy of re-
sponse. Furthermore, these processes help consumers structure their corn-
39. See id at 1230-34 (highlighting dangers of secrecy in arbitration).
40. Geoffrey Davies, Can Dispute Resolution Be Made Generally Available?, 12 OTAGO
L. REv. 305, 308-16 (2010).
41. See id. at 309-18 (noting what works and does not work in dispute resolution mech-
anisms).
42. The BBB has been active in handling consumers' escalating complaints against
cellular phone companies. See US BBB 2009 Statistics Sorted by Complaint, BETTER Bus.
BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/us/storage/16/documents/stats%20pdf/us-complaint.pdf (last
visited Apr. 14, 2012); US BBB 2008 Statistics Sorted by Complaints, BETTER Bus. BUREAU
http://www.bbb.org/us/storage/l 6/documents/stats%20pdflus bycomplaint 2008_inter.pdf
(last visited Apr. 14, 2012); US BBBs Sorted by Complaint 2007, BETTER Bus. BUREAU,
http://www.bbb.org/us/storage/O/shared%20documents/complaintstats/stat2OO7/us-by-compl
aint 2007.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
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plaints and communications with companies.4 3 This can be especially useful
for consumers who otherwise lack the education or experience to assert
complaints on their own.
Similarly, the social networking website Facebook has implemented an
ODR mechanism through TRUSTe for resolution of consumers' privacy
disputes.' Under the applicable rules, Facebook must comply with TRUSTe
determinations regarding the misuse of personally identifiable information
or violations of privacy. The effectiveness of the TRUSTe process is un-
clear, however, because consumers confused by Facebook's labyrinth of
terms and conditions are generally unaware of their rights to use the pro-
cess.
45
It is no surprise that the BBB and Facebook have used ODR processes.
These processes can save companies and consumers time and money.
Online processes also may ease the stresses of seeking assistance by provid-
ing a structured, text-based means for communicating needs.46 Furthermore,
the Internet has opened new avenues for consumers to share purchase and
product information, and for companies to gather information to assist their
marketing efforts.47 Watchdog groups also have used the Internet to alert
consumers regarding unsafe products and onerous consumer contracts. They
also should use their websites to post information about companies' dispute
resolution mechanisms.
To date, many ODR mechanisms are non-binding. However, online
remedy mechanisms with respect to international B2C eConflicts should be
binding. OArb in particular is warranted for effective resolution of these
43. Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Amy Walters, Gender Differences in Negotiation Outcome,
52 PERS. PSYCHOL. 653, 657-59 (noting research suggesting that constraints on communica-
tion modes may reduce gender bias).
44. See John Gamble, Facebook & TRUSTe, TRUSTE (May 12, 2010),
http://www.truste.com/blog/2010/05/12/facebook-truste/ (noting Facebook and TRUSTe's
business relationship since 2006). See also File a Privacy Complaint, TRUSTE,
http://watchdog.truste.com/pvr.php?page=complaint (last visited Apr. 14, 2012); Privacy
Program Requirements, TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com/privacy-program-requirements/
(last visited Apr. 14, 2012); Watchdog Dispute Resolution Process, TRUSTE,
http://www.truste.com/whyTRUSTe_privacyservices/online-privacy-watchdog (last visited
Apr. 14, 2012).
45. See Watchdog Dispute Resolution Process, supra note 44 (further explaining the
TRUSTe process). Notably however, the process strictly limits eligible claims and allowable
remedies, and gives TRUSTe great discretion in applying these limits. Id.
46. See Jelle van Veenen, From :-(to :-) Using Online Communication to Improve Dis-
pute Resolution, 1-20 (Tilburg Inst. for Interdisciplinary Studies of Civil Law & Conflict
Resolution Sys., Working Paper No. 002/2010, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-1618719 (noting how online communications can improve dispute
resolution).
47. Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 43, at 659 (noting studies showing that CMC




disputes because it provides a binding award.48 While ODR that facilitates
voluntary agreements is laudable, it is often unsuccessful and allows parties
to "walk away" without reaching resolution. This leaves businesses espe-
cially prone to "walk away" from consumers' cross-border complaints be-
cause these businesses know that consumers face insurmountable hurdles in
pursing cross-border litigation. By requiring parties to commit to binding
arbitration, OArb agreements provide incentive for parties to take the pro-
cess seriously and put aside their anger to reach a resolution. 9
Nonetheless, OArb commitment must be voluntary and properly regu-
lated to ensure fairness.5 ° As noted above, some companies impose onerous
arbitration clauses in their B2C form contracts. Some also claim that B2C
arbitration improperly curbs consumer rights due to pro-business admin-
istration.5" Although it is questionable whether this negativity is warranted,
negative perceptions nonetheless matter. OArb procedures will not gain
international endorsement or consumers' open-minded participation unless
all involved are assured that the procedures are neutral and fair.52 Policy-
makers and dispute resolution providers must work together to build OArb
mechanisms that sufficiently protect consumers from surprise and preserve
their rights to internationally recognized standards for due process.
Accordingly, the minimum standards parsed above should guide poli-
cymakers in constructing OArb that is low-cost, speedy, and accessible."
OArb policies should cap consumers' costs and set strict time limits for
companies to respond to complaints. Policies also should allow for sufficient
but properly limited discovery, and set clear timelines for evidentiary sub-
48. OArb differs from other ODR because it results in a final third-party determination
without the cost and stress of traditional litigation. See Schmitz, supra note 34, at 178-244
(proposing expansion of OArb).
49. See Warranty Woes, supra note 23, at 658-61, 677-80 (discussing importance of
finality with respect to consumer disputes).
50. See David J. Bilinsky, 10 Collaborative Principles for Leading a Successful ODR
System Initiative, ODR & CONSUMERS 2010 (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://www.odrandconsumers2010.org/ 2010/09/01/10-collaborative-principles-for-leading-a-
successful-odr-system-initiative (guest post by Ben Ziegler) (providing tips for increasing
confidence in e-commerce through ODR systems); David J. Bilinsky, Implementation Con-
sideration for ODR, ODR & CONSUMERS 2010 (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.odrandconsumers2010.org/2010/08/02/implementation-considerations-for-odr
(discussing best practices for ODR); Schmitz, supra note 34, at 235-40 (discussing fairness
limits and safety measures for OArb).
51. See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867-68 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that a class action ban in an arbitration agreement was unconscionable where
it was likely to preclude most consumers from seeking remedies on their small claims).
52. See Schmitz, supra note 34, at 226-44 (proposing regulated ODR for consumer
complaint resolution).
53. See supra Part III.A.
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missions. Clear rules should also set deadlines for arbitrators to render
awards, and give parties short timelines for any appeals.
These arbitrators also should have power and means for holding com-
panies responsible for failing to quickly comply with arbitration awards.
Parties must be held to strict deadlines for complying with awards, and gar-
nishment or other such mechanisms should be available to force this com-
pliance. In addition, regulators should seek user feedback in order to foster
continual system improvements, and compile ratings for arbitrators and
merchants subject to the process. 54
Furthermore, online arbitrators must be neutral and properly trained,
and consumers must have a voice in selecting the arbitrators. This can be
accomplished by creating a database of accredited arbitrators that includes
credentials and other background information regarding each arbitrator.
Consumers should then have the power to choose from among these ap-
proved arbitrators. This would help consumers to have a voice in the process
and to feel more comfortable with the anonymity of CMC.
OArb transparency regulations could mimic California's code provi-
sions requiring arbitration administrators to gather and post basic infor-
mation regarding consumer claims in an easily searchable format.55 This
information includes the names of companies involved, types of disputes,
prevailing parties, time from filing to disposition, claim and award amounts,
arbitrators' names, and other basic information not properly redacted as con-
fidential.56 Such postings help increase trust and transparency with respect
to the process, and reveal recalcitrant companies. They also would give
businesses incentive for providing quick remedies to avoid embarrassment,
and uncover party and award patterns that would suggest an arbitration ad-
ministrator's bias for repeat-player companies who continually use its ser-
vices.57
54. See Schmitz, supra note 34, at 226-44. See also Xu Junke, Development of ODR in
China, 42 No. 3 UCC L. J. ART 2, 265-72 (2010) (discussing ODR in China and the need
for increased online trust and consumer confidence to boost ODR processes and encourage
"self-discipline" of e-commerce); Colin Rule et al., Designing a Global Consumer Online
Dispute Resolution (ODR) System for Cross-Border Small Value-High Volume Claims-OAS
Developments, 42 No. 3 UCC L. J. ART 1 (2010), available at
http://colinrule.com/writing/ucclj.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2012) (discussing how to create a
global system for resolving consumer disputes and highlighting the United States' proposal
for an ODR system). Full discussion of ODR and OArb and means for expanding them in a
measured manner is beyond the scope of this Article, but further discussion may be found in
Schmitz, supra note 34, at 177-244 (proposing prudent expansion).
55. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2011).
56. Id.
57. Further research and policy discussions should nonetheless guide OArb's develop-
ment. See Rule et al., supra note 54, at 222-30. Debates on ODR have grown on global lev-
els, and hold great promise for consumer claims resolution. See The 11th International
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Alongside OArb mechanisms, policymakers also should maintain a
central website for consumers to research and share product information and
complaints.5" For example, they could learn from online watchdog websites
such as the Utility Consumers' Action Network (UCAN).59 UCAN provides
an online forum for consumers to alert others regarding contract dangers and
to offer suggestions for avoiding or responding to consumer issues.6" Simi-
larly, the new Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) database
launched in March 2011 provides consumers and manufacturers with a cen-
tral portal for reporting and learning about product problems.6" The New
York Times and other news sources also maintain online columns for voicing
consumer complaints and seeking assistance.
6 2
Nonetheless, policy initiatives may be necessary to verify complaint in-
formation and combat cyber bullying and anti-normative behavior on the
Internet.63 Regulators should monitor postings to preclude abusive or false
Online Dispute Resolution Forum, ODR 2012, http://www.odr2012.org/node?page=l (last
visited Apr. 14, 2012) (announcing the most recent ODR conference).
58. See Gibbons, supra note 33, at 3 (discussing how the Internet is used by consumers
to research prices). Although some individuals are not sufficiently careful in communicating
online, there is some evidence that a growing number of online users are becoming more
cautious in light of privacy and other concerns. Susan C. Herring, Computer-Mediated Com-
munication on the Internet, 36 ANN. REV. INFO. Sci. & TECH. 109, 144-45 (Blaise Cronin ed.,
2002) (noting how internet users are becoming more careful in their online communications
due to concerns about privacy threats).
59. See UCAN, http://www.ucan.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2012) (describing itself as a
"non-profit, public interest consumer advocacy" group focusing on energy, communications,
and water, and providing a complaint forum along with additional resources). See also Mike
Scott, Cell Phone Companies Changing Contract Terms, THE FINE PRINT: UCAN'S
CONSUMER WATCHDOG BLOG (Nov. 12, 2007),
http://www.ucan.org/blog/telecommunications/wireless/contract change/
cellphone companies changingcontract terms (alerting others of changes in contracts that
many would not catch).
60. UCAN, supra note 59.
61. CPSC database is also part of a larger technology upgrade aimed to provide consum-
ers and others with greater access to complaint information. Iffy Product? Now a Way to Tell,
CONSUMER REP., Feb. 2011, at 16, 16-17 [hereinafter Iffy Product] (highlighting the difficul-
ties of obtaining information regarding complaints and companies' power in blocking infor-
mation) (discussing the new database and other technology upgrades contemplated by the
CPSC).
62. See, e.g., David Segal, Scammed? Rebuffed? Ignored? Read On, N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 2009, http://nytimes.com/2009/05/l0/your-money/lOhaggler.html (regular column, The
Haggler); David Segal, The Refund that Circled Before Landing, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009,
http://nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/09haggler.html (noting the first anniversary of the
column, and responding to consumers' submitted questions and complaints).
63. See van Veenen, supra note 46, at 20-23 (discussing how online communications
may actually heighten adherence to social norms, reduce the stress of F2F communication,
and allow for emotive communications).
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comments. 4 Furthermore, regulations should bar companies from disingen-
uously promoting their products and services by paying for positive reviews
or posting fake reviews ("flogging") on blogs and review sites. 6 Infor-
mation-sharing mechanisms do not enhance consumer education or inform
purchase practices when postings are not trustworthy.
These OArb and complaint posting mechanisms must be internationally
endorsed and incorporated. This is essential due to the increase in interna-
tional B2C eContracts and current lack of globally accepted and enforceable
mechanisms for resolving eConflicts. Indeed, the UNCITRAL Working
Group on ODR is leading an effort to establish an ODR mechanism for reso-
lution of certain eConflicts. This project is discussed by others in this Sym-
posium." I recently became involved in this project and look forward to
working with others in the group.
Nonetheless, the project is limited and will hopefully spark develop-
ment of more expansive OArb mechanisms for B2C disputes. For example,
the UNCITRAL Group's current proposal does not cover ODR for warranty
disputes. However, warranty claims are often at the heart of B2C eConflicts.
It would therefore be wise to build on momentum of the current
UNCITRAL project to develop an OArb program for resolution of defective
product disputes.
In sum, these are merely reform ideas to build on. Furthermore, re-
forms should increase consumers' awareness and remedy resources without
increasing litigation or government oversight that will augment public and
private costs. Transparent and accessible remedy mechanisms need not re-
quire complicated disclosures that augment costs and lead to information
overload. Instead, companies could provide customers with simple OArb
mechanisms and useful forms that guide their submission of complaints. In
addition, an international public or other independent organization com-
64. Charles Starmer-Smith, Tripadvisor Reviews: Can We Trust Them?, TELEGRAPH
(London) (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/hotels/8050127/Tripadvisor-
reviews-can-we-trust-them.html (discussing fake and spiteful reviews that severely impact
businesses, despite the reviews' lack of verification).
65. Lisa Thomas & Robert Newman, Social Networking and Blogging: The New Legal
Frontier, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 500, 516-17 (2009) (providing examples of
companies faking reviews); Mark Balnaves & James Mahoney, Editorial, The Illusion of
Control in Public Relations, PUB. REL. RESOURCE CENTER,
http://www.prismjournal.org/global.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2012) (also discussing compa-
nies covert schemes); Starmer-Smith, supra note 64 (discussing purchase reviews posted on
the popular travel review site).
66. See generally Colin Rule, Quantifying the Economic Benefits of Economic Redress:
Large E-Commerce Data Sets and the Cost-Benefit Case for Investing in Dispute Resolution,
supra at 765-76. See also Louis F. Del Duca, Colin Rule & Zbynek Loebl, Facilitating Ex-
pansion of Cross-Border E-Commerce-Developing a Global Online Dispute Resolution Sys-
tem, THE PENN ST. U. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES No. 25-2011 (Dec. 10,
2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract - 1970613.
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prised of consumer and industry leaders could monitor these mechanisms
for fairness, and post outcomes with respect to all companies on a searcha-
ble website.67 Such transparency should spark companies to improve their
complaint handling processes and help empower consumers to pursue legit-
imate complaints and protect their rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
Consumers need access to reliable resolution mechanisms for B2C
eConflicts on international levels. Litigation and in-person arbitration have
not provided such mechanisms due to prohibitive costs, unclear law, and
clashing public policies. At the same time, UNCITRAL's ODR Working
group is seeking to expand use of online remedy mechanisms for consumers
in international eConflict cases. These efforts provide promise for consum-
ers, but have not yet produced results. Consumers are therefore left on an
"island" with no bridges to reliable, fair, and low-cost mechanisms for ob-
taining remedies with respect to international ePurchases gone awry. Ac-
cordingly, it is time for policymakers to build bridges for consumers to ac-
cess remedies in these cases. Policymakers should capitalize on CMC to
create efficient and low-cost international OArb mechanisms that sufficient-
ly protect consumers from onerous company practices.
67. A full discussion of the options is beyond the scope of this Essay. Instead, this Essay
seeks to spark discussion and creative ideas for educating and empowering consumers in the
most efficient and effective manner-which may be through public or private means.
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